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Vision and Transterritory:  




This essay is about the role of visual surveillance technologies in the policing of 
the external borders of the European Union. Based on an analysis of documents 
published by EU institutions and independent organizations I argue that these 
technological innovations fundamentally alter the nature of national borders. I 
discuss how new technologies of vision are deployed to transcend the physical 
limits of territories. In the last twenty years EU member states and institutions 
have increasingly relied on various forms of remote tracking, including the use of 
drones for the purposes of monitoring frontier zones. In combination with other 
facets of the EU border management regime (such as transnational databases 
and biometrics) these technologies coalesce into a system of governance that 
has enabled intervention into neighboring territories and territorial waters 
of other states to track and target migrants for interception in the “prefrontier.” 
For jurisdictional reasons, this practice effectively precludes the enforcement of 
legal human rights obligations, which European states might otherwise have 
with regard to these persons. This article argues that this technologically 
mediated expansion of vision has become a key feature of post-Cold War 
governance of borders in Europe. The concept of transterritory is proposed to 
capture its effects. 
 
 
Since the start of this decade, news of migrant boat disasters and the resulting 
hundreds of deaths has reached European publics with predictable regularity. 




insurmountability and regular channels of entry out of reach for most would-be 
migrants, the dangerous maritime routes, primarily across the Central 
Mediterranean, remain the most plausible form of passage for thousands of 
refugees and migrants.  Over one million people arrived by sea in 2015 and just 
under 360,000 in the following year. In 2016, 4,899 persons were reported dead 
or missing in the Mediterranean and the figure for 2015 was 3,771 according to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).1  Within the 
larger context of high-level debates on the response to the ongoing migratory 
pressure at the Southern maritime borders, representatives of national 
governments and the European Commission have vowed to stop the disasters. 
They have promised to do so by aggressively pursuing people-smugglers who 
profit from the demand for transit to Europe, and by developing technological 
“solutions,” whose purpose is to control European Union (EU) borders, but also 
ostensibly to save lives. As the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia 
Malmström, said in October of 2013,  
 
The European Commission has developed a new tool, EUROSUR … to 
improve the situation. EUROSUR will help Member States to better track, 
identify and rescue small vessels at sea thanks to better coordination 
between national authorities, appropriate channels of communication 
and improved surveillance technology. (European Commission 2013b) 
 
Eurosur, that is the European Surveillance System for the monitoring of the 
external maritime and land borders of the European Union, and the technologies 




maritime border policing capacities. Nor are they straightforwardly aiming for a 
more effective Search and Rescue (SAR).2 Instead, I argue that these 
technological innovations fundamentally alter the nature of national borders. 
Expanding the area of surveillance in practice means that border agents of the 
EU and its member states are able to see places, things and people located in 
spaces that previously remained unseen. “Visibility,” as Alison Mountz has 
argued, “proves crucial to understanding how states respond to migrants … 
during highly publicized, visible, visual, and seemingly exceptional crises along 
their borders” (Mountz 2010, 23). Sovereign vision, in this case the gaze of 
agents empowered by the state to watch the border for signs of trespass, now 
encompasses the high seas, territorial waters and coastal areas of third 
countries. By reaching into those spaces it effectively decouples existing 
jurisdictional boundaries from their geographical demarcations.  
This development is part of a larger globalization-related phenomenon of 
the disaggregation and externalization of borders (Balibar 2002; Sassen 2007) in 
which “the multiple (legal and cultural, social and economic) components of the 
concept and institution of the border tend to tear apart from the magnetic line 
corresponding to the geopolitical line of separation between nation-states” 
(Mezzadra and Nilson 2013, 3). There was, to be sure, much attention in recent 
years to the planned and actual construction of new walls, fences and the 
deployment of troops along terrestrial borders, from Hungary and Greece to the 
United States, which may suggest the opposite shift: the reinforcement rather 
than disaggregation of the “geopolitical lines of separation.” Wendy Brown has 
argued that such new walls constitute a desperate response of weakened states 




2010). There is merit to her psychoanalytic argument that such spectacular 
bordering is a response to human need for protection and containment 
expressed as political anxiety and fear of the other. However, as Brown herself 
concludes, walls “are often nothing more than spectacularly expensive political 
gestures, sops to certain constituencies, signs of distresses that cannot be 
contained” (ibid., 91). In the end, evidence from the European Union points to 
the fact that states do both: they reinforce, and they disaggregate, they stretch, 
and they fortify, all along relying on advanced technological tools delivered by 
the expanding security-industrial complex (Hayes 2009; Andersson 2014).  
Within that wider context the specifics of new border technologies 
demand a closer focus. The official aims of the deployment of advanced 
networked tools such as data centers, radars, satellites, and manned and 
unmanned aircraft are more efficient control of borders and, as Malmström and 
others have insisted, also the saving of lives (European Commission 2013c). 
However, the jurisdictional consequences of the technology-enabled shifts of 
sovereign vision remain officially unacknowledged. Building on my own research 
on European responses to boat disasters on the Mediterranean (Follis 2015), and 
on the work of others who show how EU border policies exacerbate the 
migratory crisis (Albahari 2015; Mountz and Loyd 2014; Human Rights Watch 
2009; Weber and Pickering 2011; Spijkerboer 2007), I ask, how and for whom 
are jurisdictional boundaries manipulated? What are the legal and political 
benefits of these shifts and who is hoping to reap them? To answer these 
questions, I draw on STS and surveillance studies literature to develop a 
theoretical account of Eurosur as a system of “situated surveillance” (Gad and 




Europe as I present evidence from a selection of published statements and 
reports on its function and projected development. The empirical data I consider 
originates from (a) independent watchdogs and NGOs (Statewatch, the Heinrich 
Böll Foundation); (b) the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe; and (c) EU institutions themselves (European 
Commission, Frontex).3   
 
Vision beyond borders in the EU 
Bordering in Europe has a long history. The institutions of the European 
Union, however, only began to concern themselves with details of border control 
and the related matters of asylum and immigration policy in the post-Cold War 
period, as the organization was getting ready to absorb new member states in 
the postsocialist East of Europe (Zaiotti 2011). The modes of border policing 
hammered out between member states and EU supranational bodies were 
initially a reaction to the divisions of the Cold War. Bordering practices evolved 
in response to the challenges presented by the internal openness of the Schengen 
zone (Schengen Borders Code 2006 with subsequent amendments), the threat of 
terrorism and organized crime, and finally the increasing migratory pressure at 
the Southern maritime borders.4 We can trace the relationship between the 
expanding range of sovereign vision and the effective manipulation of 
jurisdictional boundaries through an analysis of the evolution of border 
surveillance, from the 1999 European Council Summit in Tampere, Finland, 
where key aspects of EU justice and home affairs were decided (Bunyan 1999), 
to the establishment of the Eurosur. The latter was approved by the European 




migrant boat disaster that claimed over 360 victims and accounted for the 
atmosphere of moral urgency that helped frame Eurosur as a life-saving tool 
(European Parliament 2013a).  
The acceleration of the development of EU border controls in the late 
1990s began with the securitization of borders in Eastern Europe. In the late 
1990s EU ministers did not anticipate movements of refugees from North Africa 
and the Middle East across the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas on the scale 
witnessed from 2011 onwards. Southern European states formed task groups on 
maritime borders (Western Sea Borders Centre in Madrid and Eastern Sea 
Borders Centre in Piraeus), but apart from the sea route between Albania and 
Italy, which saw the large-scale exodus of Albanians in the early 1990s (PACE 
1992), boat arrivals were seen as a trickle rather than a mass phenomenon (IOM 
2014: 86).  
Thus, investment was concentrated on the new Eastern external borders 
of the EU, where throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s Cold War-era analog 
tools were gradually replaced with digital technology for regulating traffic as 
well as capturing and processing both visual and personal biometric data.5 
Watchtowers were dismantled, electric signaling fences and first generation 
night vision decommissioned. Instead, border units gained access to radar 
systems, towers with remotely controlled thermal vision cameras, ground 
sensors to trigger the cameras and portable motion detectors––all operating in 
concert with networked computers connected to EU-wide databases, such as the 
Schengen Information System (information on persons and items of interest) 
and Eurodac (biometric information). Helicopters and thermal vision vehicles 




security devices came equipped with day and night vision cameras with digital 
zooming, capable of penetrating the darkness far into the territory of the 
neighboring state.  
These devices are not just paraphernalia or elements of the border 
spectacle introduced for what Peter Andreas described, in the US-Mexico border 
context, as the “symbolic and perceptual effects of escalation” in border policing 
(Andreas 2001, 4). Rather, they are designed effectively to project power beyond 
the physical boundaries of sovereign territory. As Mezzadra and Nielson put it, 
they render territory elastic (2013, 8), by stretching, in everyday policing 
practice if not in law, the limits of a single jurisdiction. For example, the 
deployment of thermal vision vehicles with long-range cameras on the external 
EU border between Poland and Ukraine enables Polish guards who are there to 
stop unauthorized crossings into the Polish/EU territory to take preemptive 
action. They are able to track the prospective border-crossers while they are still 
in Ukrainian territory, sometimes several hundred meters away from the Polish 
border. Such remote detection becomes an actionable finding. The Polish guards 
pass the information on to Ukrainian guards, who are then obliged, based on 
mutual agreements, to apprehend the prospective trespassers. Having never set 
foot on Polish soil the would-be migrants never become the “problem” of the 
Polish border guards. They would not have to be identified or registered in 
Poland. They are, instead, “a problem of the Ukrainians” (Follis 2012). This 
means that it is up to Ukrainian authorities and their policies and legal codes to 
apprehend, detain, remove or release into a legal limbo those migrants who were 
prevented from crossing the EU border. For as long as they remain in Ukrainian 




and, should they be detained, they would not be legally entitled to certain human 
rights guarantees, as stipulated in EU directives. They would instead find 
themselves within Ukrainian jurisdiction and would be subject to Ukrainian 
laws, not Polish or EU laws and standards concerning the treatment of economic 
migrants and asylum seekers (Rechitsky 2010). In this manner, Ukraine fulfills 
the role of a migration buffer zone for the rest of Europe.   
The strategic significance of new Eastern borders was reflected in 
locating the headquarters of Frontex in the Polish capital Warsaw.6 Its 
establishment, in 2004, was the culmination of several years of debates 
concerning the ways to enforce EU’s external borders as a compensatory 
measure for the freedom of movement within the Schengen zone. It was an 
extension of the logic of controlling Europe’s external borders by looking, and 
increasingly acting, beyond them. In 2005 the establishment, under EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, of the European Union Border Assistance Mission 
(EUBAM) to Ukraine and Moldova to promote “border control, customs and 
trade norms” in neighboring post-Soviet states further cemented that approach 
(Jeandesboz 2015).7  
In the years that followed it was becoming clear that the fears of mass 
border breaches from the east were not in fact borne out. Instead, in 2006 Spain 
saw a sudden increase in the numbers of Africans attempting to reach its 
territory via the Canary Islands, from approximately 5,000 people in 2005 to 
over 39,000 in 2006 (PACE 2008, Carrera 2007). It was in response to that 
perceived crisis that in 2007 Frontex for the first time deployed a RABIT, a “rapid 
border intervention team.” RABITs, created by secondary EU legislation, consist 




Frontex to provide “rapid technical and operation assistance” in situ to the EU 
states that request it.8 Under the guise of such “technicalities” and “operational 
cooperation,” Frontex provided specialized equipment, including patrol boats, 
cars and helicopters that were furnished with long-range thermal cameras and 
other devices. Joint Frontex and national patrols searched for and intercepted 
migrants at sea beyond territorial waters and returned them to ports of 
departure, effectively preventing them from lodging asylum claims on European 
soil (PACE 2008, par. 48). 
This stage in the development of border surveillance, where the gaze of 
the border agent is directed increasingly beyond the external border, is a key 
step in the emergence of what I call transterritory, that is, the territory that has 
been rendered elastic through the application of modern technologies of vision. 
It is elastic in the sense that it expands as well as retracts. It remains strictly 
bounded and difficult to penetrate for those coming in from the outside. But 
those controlling sovereign borders can stretch them through their capacity to 
see, and therefore to act, beyond the physical limits of their domain, for example, 
by pursuing traffickers or transferring responsibility for intercepted migrants to 
the authorities of another state. This manipulation of space and boundaries 
ensures that states can evade, in ways I discuss below, the obligations imposed 
by the current system of international and EU law, which remains grounded in 
the static, non-elastic Westphalian notion of sovereign territoriality. According to 
this notion, which is enshrined in the UN Charter and other instruments of 
international law, states have exclusive power and sovereign jurisdiction over 
their territory (Vaughn-Williams 2008). Not only are they entitled to non-




conditions of border crossings into their territory (Kukathas 2011). In the 
European Union, most states have transferred some of their border control 
competencies to the supranational level through the process known as “pooling 
sovereignty” (Andreas and Snyder 2000).9 This enabled the creation of agencies, 
such as Frontex, which act based on a mandate from EU members. In spite of 
these arrangements EU states reserve the right to formal sovereignty (Keohane 
2002, 748) and as a principle it remains fundamental to the exercise of 
international relations and the practice of international law (including refugee 
law and human rights). However, as Agnew and others have shown, 
territoriality, imagined as “blocks of rigidly bordered space,” has long been 
transcended by global flows and “effective sovereignty is not necessarily 
predicated on and defined by the strict and fixed territorial boundaries of 
individual states” (Agnew 2005, 442, emphasis added, see also Jones and 
Johnson 2016).  
The Eurosur system emerges from the foundations established in 
Tampere and it embraces elastic boundaries. It has been in development since 
the early days of Frontex (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015). It is designed to be fully 
transterritorial, that is, to detach more effectively than ever before the state’s 
ability to watch its borders from the actual physical boundary. The practical 
implementation of this approach, however, appears much messier than the 
design might suggest. 
 
Eurosur as a system of “situated surveillance” 
Eurosur, established by EU Regulation No. 1052/2013, is an evolving 




to provide the EU border agency Frontex and national authorities in EU member 
states with a “situational awareness”–– not just of the external EU border itself, 
but also of the “pre-frontier,” which is the sea and land adjacent to the border but 
beyond the jurisdiction of any EU member state (European Commission 2011, 
Hayes and Vermeulen 2012). This breadth of vision enables new opportunities in 
terms of border control. But do the consequences really include, as it has been 
claimed, increased safety for those who board the boats to reach European 
coasts? What do these changes imply for the boats’ passengers and for their 
advocates in Europe?    
 Long before 9/11, and more heavily since, security regimes at national 
borders have relied on a range of surveillance tools designed to extend the 
border guards’ range of vision, both telescopically (to see people and objects at a 
distance from the border) and microscopically (to detect document forgeries or 
examine biometrics). Vision is the human ability to interpret our surroundings 
by processing information contained in the spectrum of visible light. But the 
contemporary international border constitutes what Charles Goodwin calls a 
“complex perceptual field” (1994, 611) and as such it demands more than the 
bare human capacity to see, with or without prosthetic devices. Like other such 
fields (those of science, medicine, policing and any other modern professional 
practice), it calls for professional vision that is organized in a specific manner, as 
a “temporally unfolding process encompassing both human interaction and 
situated tool use” (Goodwin 1994, 607). I approach these tools as technologies of 
vision in Donna Haraway’s sense, that is, as skilled, or professional, practices of 
visualization. “The “eyes” made available in modern technological sciences,” 




organic ones are active perceptual systems, building on translations and specific 
ways of seeing, that is ways of life. There is no unmediated photograph or 
passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and machines” (Haraway 
1988, 583). The same is true of maps and other representations of space, as we 
know from the insights of critical cartographers (Pickles 2004). Those 
representations of the land and the sea that are needed for effective control of 
borders issue from vantage points at the intersection of the security industry and 
European and national governance of migration. 
The 21st century framing of migration as a security problem goes hand in 
hand with the entrenchment of transterritorial vision. It is a distinctive way of 
seeing, a form of “situated surveillance” (Gad and Lauritsen 2009), which, like 
any type of vision, is “produced in specific arrangements of humans and 
technologies” (ibid., 51). The specificity of the arrangements entails “situated, 
cooperative work” of designated people and machines (ibid., 53). Those people 
and machines are situated geographically (in member states that have external 
EU borders), institutionally (in purpose-designed coordination centers) and 
historically, in the sense that their work is framed by a particular early 21st 
century juncture in the history of the European nation state. At this juncture, 
political discourse affirms the need to reassert sovereignty over rights of 
territorial access (Andreas 2003). This is manifest in the calls to “take control of 
borders,” which as of 2016-17 continue to gain traction and win votes across the 
continent and are embraced not just by the political right but also by much of the 
left (Feldman 2012), by Eurosceptics and Euroenthusiasts alike.  
At the same time, however, the actual practice of border control is 




marked by friction between agencies at the national and the EU level (Frontex). 
In spite of the investment in new assets and approaches introduced in response 
to the exceptionally high number of migrants arriving in 2015 (European 
Commission 2015, Frontex 2016b), these factors complicate translating the 
discourse of “taking control” into action. In the 2015 Agenda on Migration the 
European Commission introduced the rapid deployment of EU agents in 
“hotspots” of migratory pressure and it renewed commitment to returning 
migrants who do not meet the criteria for asylum (Schindel 2016). In 2016, an 
agreement between the EU and Turkey drastically reduced the number of 
persons entering Europe via Greece (Collett 2016). At the same time, the rising 
fortunes of anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties in the West and East of Europe 
suggest that these changes hardly translate into a public perception that the 
problems at Europe’s outer borders are actually being addressed (Lochocki 
2016; Reynié 2016).     
Apart from the complexity stemming from the multiplicity of agents and 
tasks, the drive to shore up border control has thus far been checked by a set of 
(arguably waning) institutionalized commitments to human and refugee rights, 
which were designed in the post-1945 period to protect persons at risk of abuse 
by their own states (Benhabib 2004; Dembour and Kelly 2011). This body of 
international law prohibits refoulement,10 collective expulsion and arbitrary 
detention. It obliges nation states and EU agencies to consider applications for 
asylum from persons who declare such need upon arrival, and to follow certain 
minimum procedures in the treatment of applicants. Border policing must take 
account of these obligations. As ethnographers have documented, “by the time 




their own terms who they are” (Mountz 2010, 26). As I have argued elsewhere, a 
key element of border agents’ professional vision is the skill of preliminary 
screening and sorting of arriving migrants into relevant categories, i.e. potential 
subjects of refugee law, trafficking victims, unaccompanied minors and 
“economic migrants” who are not likely to qualify for international protection 
and thus could be deportable (Follis 2012). The degree to which border agencies 
respect international human rights obligations in their everyday work is under 
scrutiny from a range of international organizations, human rights watchdogs 
and activist groups (see e.g. PACE 2012). Because of the financial and logistical 
burden of these legal commitments, and because of the scrutiny, the designers of 
border and migration policy have been incessantly inventive when it comes to 
restricting the scope of their responsibility under human rights and refugee law. 
Transterritorial sovereign vision delivers new possibilities to do so. It 
offers national and European border and coast guards the technologically 
mediated ability to see beyond the physical and jurisdictional limits of a given 
state territory and to generate and share images of remote spaces. It enables 
agents to locate objects, persons and groups within those spaces, long before 
they reach the sovereign borders of EU member states. This new way of seeing, I 
argue, is engineered to open up unprecedented possibilities of preemptive action 
and in this way to allow the most effective and seamless evasion yet of human 
rights obligations towards migrants. 
 
Military tools for border control: the case of drones  
Such range of vision as that offered by Eurosur historically has been 




has reached unprecedented levels with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 
whose deployment by the US military has been the subject of much recent debate 
(see e.g. Benjamin 2012; Riza 2013; Gregory 2011; Suchman 2015). In the 
military, the purpose of transterritorial vision is always operational; not just to 
see or record, but to track and target that which is seen. As Grégoire Chamayou 
notes in Drone Theory, within military surveillance technology, “vision is a 
sighting: it serves not to represent objects but act upon them, to target them. The 
function of the eye is that of a weapon” (Chamayou 2015, 114).  
In the United States and in Europe, drones have also been embraced for 
the purposes of border policing.11 The framework of Eurosur stipulates planned 
deployment of drones, or Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), as they are 
known in the EU jargon, over the Mediterranean Sea. In 2016, this technology 
was in Research and Development stage, piloted in selected areas through 
European Commission-funded projects.12 Also underway is a PR effort to 
disassociate this technology from the idea of the “killing machines” deployed in 
counter-terrorism contexts. Hence the avoidance of the term “drone,” and even 
of the seemingly more neutral “UAV” in official publications. Instead, as Hayes 
and colleagues have shown, the European Commission seeks to “condition” 
European publics “into accepting the roll-out of drones” by emphasizing their 
utility in law enforcement and humanitarianism (Hayes, Jones and Töpfer 2014, 
24; Hasian 2016). Indeed, the Italian Navy operation Mare Nostrum, which ran 
from October 2013 to October 2014 in the Central Mediterranean and brought 
approximately 140 thousand people to safety, deployed Predator drones 
purchased from the United States ostensibly for humanitarian purposes (Marin 




humanitarian, as Marin shows, the drones were used mostly for surveillance 
purposes and their “deployment is connected to the strengthening of the 
intelligence dimension of border controls, which is part of a policy of 
externalization of border controls to [third countries]” (ibid., 129). The Frontex-
led operation Triton that succeeded the Mare Nostrum mission has a different 
mandate (border control rather than search and rescue) and lesser range and 
assets, which involve manned surveillance aircraft but not drones (Frontex 
2014).  
RPAS constitute only one element in the arrangement of humans and 
machines that produce transterritorial vision, but they enable agencies to act in 
new ways on the perceived threat of irregular migration. In the context of 
Eurosur, documents make no mention of weaponizing drones, but they affirm 
that remotely piloted aircraft could be used, at a fraction of the cost of manned 
aircraft and with greater flexibility, for the monitoring of the external land 
borders and the pre-frontier area to “detect, classify and track all targets of 
interest independently of their size, as fast as possible and for as long as possible 
(persistent surveillance)” (European Commission JRC 2015, 15). “Targets of 
interest” are, for example, overloaded fishing vessels, where the detection 
focuses on an anomaly, such as the large number of people onboard as opposed 
to a normal-load vessel (ibid.). A “target” is also a mobile phone signal emanating 
from a vessel, vehicle or a person, particularly within an area where the normal 
signal density is low (ibid., 60).  In addition to being deployed on the “blue” 
(maritime) and “green” (land) border they could “help with the monitoring of 
selected neighboring third-country ports and coasts” (Heyes and Vermeulen 





The monitoring of a port could be done in order to determine if/when a 
specific vessel has departed. Coasts “with a distance of more than 40 
nautical miles from the coasts of EU Member States” … could be 
monitored by drones in order to recognize “preparatory activities” that 
might indicate illegal immigration “such as the erection of tents, huts, the 
gathering of vehicles or boats placed on the beach.” (ibid., 38) 
 
In itself, the adoption of military technologies for law enforcement is nothing 
new, and neither are close ties between armed forces, national border guards 
and weapons manufacturers (Jones and Johnson 2016). What is new is the 
deployment of military technologies at and beyond borders that are designed to 
treat migrants not just as persons on the move encountering state borders but as 
physical and virtual (mobile phone signal) targets moving through space. The 
drone is sent to track the target beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of EU 
member states. The agents can therefore use the data it obtains to preempt the 
target’s entry into the sovereign space. 13   
Border guards use tools such as aerial surveillance and night vision to 
achieve a comprehensive view of traffic at the boundaries of state territory. But 
that traffic “is not simply there, ready-made and waiting for neutral observation” 
(Gad and Lauritsen 2009, 51). Instead, the guards’ perceptions of what is 
happening at the border emerge through the interactive process of sharing and 
interpreting live events, visual representations, risk analysis, country reports 
and intelligence findings, weather patterns and other material and linguistic 




achieve “situational awareness” (European Commission 2013a) at the border, 
that is, a real-time, or as close to real-time as possible, picture of what is 
happening in the frontier and pre-frontier zone.  
But situational awareness is paradoxical. The official documents that 
discuss it represent it as a form of near-panoptic vision, in the sense that it 
includes everything relevant to border control in one view: illegal border 
crossings, criminal activity, ordinary commercial traffic and irregular 
movements (Frontex 2015). On closer inspection, however, it may rather 
resemble Bruno Latour’s oligopticon, that is, a site that “does exactly the 
opposite” of a panopticon, producing “extremely narrow views of the 
(connected) whole” (Latour 2005, 181). An oligopticon enables very detailed 
observation, and the tracing of a single mobile phone signal can exemplify that. 
But, as Latour points out, such observation is susceptible to blinding, distortion 
and misinterpretation. For example, there can be many reasons that a phone 
signal is lost or interrupted. But this could potentially compromise a border 
control operation to which that signal was vital, even with the hypothetical 
drone with the signal-tracking device being part of a larger interconnected 
system (European Commission JRC 2015).     
Given the novelty of the platforms that are to deliver this new way of 
seeing, the complexity of the jurisdictional context in which they are to be 
deployed, and the secrecy surrounding many aspects of this deployment, 
research on planned and actual drone operations at borders is only beginning to 
emerge (Marin 2016; Hayes and Vermeulen 2012; Hayes, Jones and Töpfer 
2014). Yet in spite of our limited knowledge of how border drones might work in 




manned aircraft and satellite-based systems of aerial surveillance, search and 
rescue (SAR) and anti-smuggling operations, it is still possible to highlight the 
questions that arise when the state’s capacity to see is deliberately and routinely 
extended beyond the boundaries of state territory.14 Given what we know about 
transterritorial vision’s capacities and limitations in tracking and targeting, what 
might it mean for migrants themselves and, more broadly, for the political and 
legal efforts on behalf of migrants’ rights?  
To appreciate how the introduction of remotely piloted aircraft reframes 
the professional vision of border guards and therefore affects outcomes for 
passengers of migrant boats, it is instructive to turn to Derek Gregory’s work on 
the role of military Predator drones in catalyzing the killing of civilians in 
Afghanistan (2011). Gregory observes that the drone offers the illusion of a fully 
transparent view of the battle space. Yet, as he has shown drawing on Haraway 
(1988), the promise of an all-seeing “eye in the sky” does not hold up. He too sets 
aside the concept of vision as a “purely biological capacity” and urges us instead 
to engage with the “‘scopic regimes’ through which drone operations take place” 
(Gregory 2011: 190).  Scopic regimes “denote a mode of visual apprehension that 
is culturally constructed and prescriptive, socially structured and shared” (ibid.). 
In war, as in other contexts, that which is seen is historically conditioned and 
dependent on political and cultural perceptions embedded in the very design of 
the technology of vision that is being deployed. In the context of the war on 
terror battlefield, Gregory argues, the UAV scopic regime delivers “spaces of 
constructed visibility [which are] also always spaces of constructed invisibility––
because they are not technical, but rather techno-cultural accomplishments” 




a special kind of intimacy that consistently privileges the view of the hunter-
killer” (ibid.).  At the same time, the interpretation of who and what is visible in 
the video feed is an always complex process involving multiple actors occupying 
different positions in the hierarchy and different physical locations. The amply 
documented instances of killing civilians in unmanned and manned aerial strikes 
are often the result of culturally and politically skewed interpretation applied to 
an ambiguous picture, as performed by military personnel on the ground and in 
the air, ultimately to decide that a lethal attack is justified (see Wilke this issue). 
Transterritorial vision such as that produced by Eurosur likewise may 
offer the illusion of transparent surveillance at what one document describes as 
a “non-negligible” distance (European Commision JRC 2015). And yet the picture 
it delivers is always already compromised by the oligoptic characteristics of its 
own infrastructure and by the culturally and politically mediated preconceptions 
of its embedded actors. Those actors, while not trained to kill in the military 
sense, participate, as Gregory Feldman documents ethnographically, in an 
enterprise that perpetuates the “structural marginalization of migrants” 
(Feldman 2013, 137). The administrative logic of migration management 
renders the people on the move anonymous and depersonalized, “just statistics,” 
according to one of Feldman’s informants (ibid. 136).  Some individuals working 
within the system may well have some sympathy for the plight of migrants, or 
what Feldman describes as “an ambivalent ethical assessment of the effect of 
their work on others” (ibid.). Even so, this pales against the overwhelming logic 
of what Chamayou calls “hunting illegals,” that is, the “technique of governing” 
the structurally marginalized “by making people feel insecure—putting people 




down and deported” (Chamayou 2012, 142). The scopic regime of border drones 
produces its own intimacies and privileged points of view, in this case those of an 
ambivalent border guard and would-be humanitarian who from a detached 
office location sees at once an overloaded boat at risk of sinking and an 
anonymous mass that must be stopped from crossing the border.  
 
Transterritorial sovereign vision in practice 
Eurosur, as the European Commission informs us, is a mechanism 
whereby “Member States’ authorities responsible for border surveillance 
(border guards, coast guards, police, customs and navies) will be able to 
exchange operational information and cooperate with each other, with Frontex 
and with neighboring countries” (European Commission 2011). At its core, the 
idea is to enable real-time (or as close to real time as possible) border-related 
information sharing through a state of the art “system of systems” including EU 
and national satellites, radars, sensors and drones feeding both visual and 
numerical data to Eurosur national coordination centers (Lemberg-Pedersen 
2015, European Commission 2013). Operational cooperation under Eurosur 
“engages the EU in policing neighbor state borders and vice versa” (Carmel 
2013). It focuses in the first instance on the Southern maritime borders of 
Europe, but it draws Northern Europe’s technological expertise and industry into 
the project. By promoting the use of drones and other robotic technology in EU 
border surveillance, the European Commission is ramping up the business 
incentives for security and military technology companies to enmesh themselves 
ever more closely in what Andersson has called Europe’s “illegality industry” 




to serve as the hub of the system. As described by Jorrit Rijpma and Mathias 
Vermeulen, data shared within the Eurosur framework 
 
may consist of information related to incidents at the EU’s external land 
and sea borders, the status and position of patrols and small vessels as 
well as analytical reports and intelligence, for instance on changed 
migration routes or new methods used by traffickers in human beings or 
drugs. This data is then used to establish situational pictures at the 
national and European levels, as well as a pre-frontier situational sketch. 
(Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 454) 
 
Official communications emphasize that “the increased exchange of 
information and the use of modern surveillance technology introduced by 
Eurosur can also be vital for saving the lives of migrants attempting to reach the 
shores of EU Member States in small and unseaworthy boats that are very 
difficult to track” (European Commission 2011; see also European Commission 
2013). But such assurances are not to be taken at face value. To fully appreciate 
the limits of the EU and member states’ commitments to “saving lives,” we must 
unpack the concept of the “pre-frontier situational sketch.” 
The “pre-frontier” is neither an established legal term nor a recognizable 
concept in political geography, international relations, or any other field that 
engages with cross-border relationships between states. It has been coined for 
the purposes of EU border control but it lacks a precise definition. The Eurosur 
Regulation of 2013 provides only that “‘pre-frontier area’ means the 




that the framework will provide “selective monitoring of designated pre-frontier 
areas at the external borders, which have been identified through risk analysis 
and information as potential departure or transit areas for illegal migration or 
cross-border crime” (Article 12). There is no mention of how far the pre-frontier 
extends, or whether any type of “area,” that is land, or water, sovereign territory 
or the high seas, could be part of it. We can only assume that the vagueness is 
strategic, the concept to be stretched and adapted as needed. The Regulation is 
somewhat clearer on what it understands to constitute “situational picture,” 
namely,  
 
a graphical interface to present near-real-time data and information 
received from different authorities, sensors, platforms and other sources, 
which is shared across communication and information channels with 
other authorities in order to achieve situational awareness and support 
the reaction capability along the external borders and the pre-frontier 
area. (Article 3(d))16 
 
What this technocratic language hides in plain sight is that seeing more 
paradoxically enables member states to do less. Agents taking part in Frontex 
operations, stretched between their migration and crime control responsibilities 
and the ill-defined obligations to respond to life-threatening emergencies, are to 
receive a far-reaching picture of vehicles, vessels and groups of people who 
might be at different stages of approach towards the borders.17 But the 
ostensibly more effective and cost-efficient surveillance of the “pre-frontier,” 




migrants who attempt the treacherous journey. It is ultimately designed to 
ensure that rather than seeking protection in Europe, those migrants remain 
within jurisdictions where no European legal responsibilities are engaged. Far 
from the tracking of endangered boats, the heart of Eurosur is the idea of 
generating a robust picture of the movements of people and things beyond 
European borders. In the “pre-frontier,” the EU and national authorities can 
project their power transterritorially, by advanced social and technical means, 
but they can shun any legal duties towards (prospective) migrants much more 
effectively than they can on their own territory.18  
The Eurosur design offers a shortcut rescue and a concrete return, 
namely the non-arrival of new groups of unwanted people. With or without 
human intervention, drones could help identify the right moment for an 
interception, which would be outsourced to the maritime border patrols of non-
EU coastal states without the need to send European assets. The migrants would 
be “rescued,” only to end up arrested and detained by authorities in “partner” 
non-EU states such as Morocco, Libya or Turkey (as has indeed already been the 
practice, see e.g. Sunderland 2016). If the system were consistently to work in 
this manner, the benefits for EU member states would be manifold. There would 
be no further embarrassing arguments between states about permission to 
disembark and no reputation-damaging boat disasters off the European cost. 
There would be no need to bury hundreds of bodies in European soil, and no 
need for “push-backs,” which have been declared illegal under international law 
by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012.19 The high number of arrivals 





Why, then, in spite of the resources that are pouring into the realization of 
this vision, has this not happened thus far and, as noted in the opening of this 
article, why has the number of deaths increased since 2013? Firstly, as many 
critics have observed, the commitment of key European actors to rescuing 
migrants is much more tenuous than official pronouncements may suggest 
(Heller and Jones 2014; Fotiadis 2015; Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015). Since the 
start of operation Triton, Frontex does have a record of bringing migrants to 
safety, claiming (in a post dated October 10, 2016) that “between January and 
November 2016, assets deployed by Frontex to JO Triton were involved in the 
rescue of 48405 people” (Frontex 2016a). But these claims have to be assessed 
in light of Frontex’s leadership’s position that search-and-rescue operations are 
counterproductive because they only encourage desperate migrants to risk the 
passage (Kingsley and Traynor 2015). The legal framework of Eurosur does not 
embrace a humanitarian rationale and, in fact, as noted by Hayes and colleagues, 
“there is no obligation under the Eurosur legislation to ensure that Member 
States or Frontex initiate search and rescue operations should their plethora of 
surveillance tools locate a vessel in distress, and Mediterranean Member States 
have fiercely resisted attempts to insert binding search and rescue clauses in 
other EU legislation” (Hayes, Jones and Töpfer 2014: 71; see also Marin 2016). 
Secondly, returning to Gregory’s argument, comparisons with the use of 
transterritorial vision in the military show that technologically advanced all-
seeing systems perform rather different work than it might seem at first glance.   
 




The drones that are being readied for deployment at Europe’s southern 
shores are, so far, not weaponized. While the visibilities and blind spots of 
Eurosur are still in an emergent state, we can provisionally hypothesize that they 
are probably not constructed with what Gregory calls “a view to kill” (Gregory 
2011). But neither are they intended with a view to rescue.  Instead, what the 
border services are conditioned to see is precisely that which the EU and its 
member states are seeking to curtail, namely the approaching “flows” or, as the 
UK PM David Cameron infamously called them, “swarms,” of migrants which 
could be “stemmed,” pushed-back with impunity or otherwise redirected 
(Shariatmadari 2015).  
The political situation in the Southern Mediterranean region as of early 
2017 remains unstable, and there are uncertainties concerning the long-term 
viability of Turkey’s role as a migrant buffer zone for Europe. In spite of 
resources poured into such instruments as the EUBAM in Libya, the project of 
drawing third countries into the necessary “partnerships” that would help EU 
states achieve their goals is complicated. But the spread of surveillance capacity 
into those regions has not been halted.  The Libyan EUBAM (EEAS nd.), with its 
17 million euro budget from August 2016 to August 2017, aims to accomplish in 
a new region that which in previous decades was accomplished in Ukraine, 
namely, the setting up of a reliable migration buffer zone. The political 
reluctance to embrace fleeing foreigners in most European countries, the 
ambiguity surrounding rescue operations (Follis 2016), and the readiness with 
which European leaders are turning to use of force against suspected migrant 
smugglers (Peers 2015) are all factors underpinning the political demand for 




 As Eurosur develops, integrating RPAS and other remote tracking 
technologies, transterritorial vision will become the norm in the policing of 
external EU borders. As it does so, we have to be prepared for the probability 
that rather than solving the problem of migrant deaths at sea, it will exacerbate it 
by introducing new vantage points from which to interpret where a given boat is 
going, whether it is in need of rescue and by whom. This is a context in which 
migrants’ access to existing modes of legal protection will be increasingly cut off. 
Contemporary human rights and refugee law, static and grounded in the 
“national order of things” (Malkki 1995), will provide an increasingly ineffectual 
toolkit for the rescue and protection of migrants, refugees and other non-
citizens. Transterritorial vision may eventually render obsolete traditional 
asylum premised on the idea that the applicant reaches the border of a sovereign 
state and asks for protection. This will be the case unless the political and judicial 
human rights establishment looks beyond the Westphalian notion of sovereignty 
(Cornelisse 2011) and learns a few transterritorial tricks of its own. Among 
hopeful signs is the idea expressed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
the Hirsi et  al. v. Italy judgment of 2012 that states do not have discretion in 
summarily returning boats migrants back to the countries they came from 
without first examining their potential claims for protection (den Hijer 2016). 
The Court asserted that international obligations may follow states as they 
embark on maritime surveillance operations. But this is only a further incentive 
to deploy drones and other technologies that reduce the need to send border 
patrol vessels to sea.   
In this light, human rights actors would do well to look towards the 




and tracked down by an assemblage of humanitarian and policing technical 
gazes, … tried to appropriate and twist this striving for visibility” by using 
phones and connections on land to make contact and demand rescue (Tazzioli 
2016, 576). As the crisis on Europe’s shores has mounted, migrants and their 
activist allies sensed that decentralized, technologically mediated direct 
interventions are more effective than appeals to governments and international 
organizations. Such bodies continue to treat “territorial sovereignty as a neutral 
and self-evident basis for contemporary political organization” (Cornelisse 2011, 
100) rather than acknowledge its nature as the manipulable resource that it has 
become. Owing to the work of such migrant-activist networks in North Africa 
and Europe we see such inherently transnational initiatives as the Watch the 
Med Alarmphone, a volunteer-operated hotline for boat people in distress, 
independent rescue boat operations and use of social media to help people 
arriving in Europe access information on available forms of assistance.20 But 
even if such actions could be extended, and sometime in the near future an 
alliance of human rights actors and grassroots activists could come together to 
launch their own drones to scan the sea for people in peril, an alternative “view 
to rescue” would not in itself subvert the Eurosur scopic regime. For that to 
happen a political commitment to not letting people die at sea would have to 
prevail over the eager politicians’ promise to “take control of borders.” 
 
 
                                                        
1 For up to date data see the UNHCR Information Sharing Portal at 




                                                                                                                                                              
2 Transnational computer networks, satellites and surveillance drones transform 
national borders in ways that cannot be sufficiently accounted for solely within 
the framework of securitization (Neal 2009) or the logic of migration 
management (Walters 2010). 
3 These sources combined reflect the range of official positions, dissenting voices 
and external critiques of the technological pursuits at the maritime borders of 
the EU.   
4 In 1985, the Schengen group (France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands) established the zone of free movement without checks on internal 
borders. The Schengen Convention became operational in 1995 and was later 
embraced by the majority of EU states. 
5 Biometrics, as Louise Amoore has shown, have become central to border 
management during the early phases of the war on terror, responding to the 
need for scientific expertise and high tech efficiency in the face of the threat of 
“illegitimate mobilities” of suspected terrorists and other undesirable subjects 
(Amoore 2006; van der Ploeg 1999).  
6 From 2004 to 2016 Frontex (Frontières extérieures) was known as the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States. It was relaunched in 2016 as the 
European Border and Coast Guard with a strengthened mandate including 
command over a “rapid reaction pool” for emergency situations at the external 
borders and the right to conduct operations in third countries (Frontex 2016b).   




                                                                                                                                                              
8 Summary of the legislation available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l14124 accessed on November 2, 2015.  
9 As Marin explains, the Schengen Border Code “provides for common rules on 
the checks and on the surveillance of the external borders. However, the whole 
construction of the Schengen integration, later incorporated into EU law… is such 
that every Member State bears the duty to control its borders and to carry out 
border checks” (Marin 2016, 125).  
10 Refoulement is the forcible expulsion or return of persons who have the right 
to be considered for refugee status to a country where they would face a threat 
to their life or freedom. It is prohibited in Article 33(1) of the UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
11 On the deployment of Predator drones along the U.S.-Mexico border see Booth 
2011; Barry 2013.  
12 For details see Hayes and Vermeulen 2012.  
13 At sea, the rescue vessels have become to some degree extensions of state 
territory where rescued migrants ought to be given an opportunity to express 
their need for international protection once the life-saving actions have been 
completed. See https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/02/italy-
historic-european-court-judgment-upholds-migrants-rights/ on the ECHR 
judgment Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 2012.  
14 Analyzing Eurosur’s pursuit of “monopoly on surveillance” linked to the use of 
satellites Marouf Hasian Jr. argues that “sensory data can be used for both 
Mediterranean policing as well as refutational and legitimation materials that are 




                                                                                                                                                              
Jr. 2016, 166, emphasis in original). The wider the space wherein such materials 
can be obtained, the richer presumably the persuasive arsenal of advocates of 
strict control.   
15 Regulation (EU) No. 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System 
(Eurosur), available at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052&from=EN [30 October 2015].  
16 See above.  
17 As Maarten den Heijer has shown, the Frontex Sea Borders Regulation 
(Regulation 656/2014) “fails to deliver concrete answers on … the exact scope of 
duties to engage in search and rescue and the guaranteeing of refugee rights” 
(den Heijer 2016, 54). 
18 M’charek et al. argue that these and related practices have a strong racial 
dimension. While the explicit language of race and ethnicity may be “absent from 
the official remit,” the “‘border machine’ simultaneously constitutes and 
discriminates against racialized groups of people” (M’charek et al. 2014, 477).   
19 As of 2015 push-backs have been documented off the coast Greece and 
elsewhere (HRW 2015). 
20 For information on Alarmphone see http://alarmphone.org/en/. One example 
of an independent boat operation is the German-based Sea-Watch (http://sea-
watch.org/en/); but see also Pallister-Wilkins 2015 for some reflections on 
operations conducted by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). CalaisAction on 
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